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POLITICS AND PRINCIPLE: AN ASSESSMENT
OF THE ROOSEVELT RECORD ON CIVIL
RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES
Peter Irons*
Franklin D. Roosevelt did little to advance the cause of civil rights and
liberties during his twelve years in the White House. Admittedly, there is
a whiff of sacrilege in this retrospective judgment of a man whose place
in the pantheon of national leadership is secure. When he took office in
1933, Roosevelt faced the awesome task of rebuilding a shattered econ-
omy. That his success in this monumental endeavor was imperfect, frus-
trated at first by a recalcitrant judiciary and later by electoral setbacks, is
less a measure of Roosevelt's presidential greatness than is his success in
mending the shattered hopes and dreams of those who suffered the rav-
ages of the Great Depression. Once the nation turned from domestic re-
construction to meet the challenge of fascist aggression, Roosevelt led a
virtually united people to the brink of military victory. His death in 1945
came at a time of unprecedented American power and prestige in the
world community.
Notwithstanding this ineradicable legacy, the fact remains that Frank-
lin Roosevelt displayed a consistent lack of leadership in the area of civil
rights and liberties. This is not to say that he did not, on the appropriate
occasion, mouth the rhetoric of concern and support for the constitutional
rights of those racial, religious, and ethnic minorities that were subjected
to prejudice or repression. Undoubtedly sincere, such expressions of con-
cern were colored both by Roosevelt's greater concern with the economic
problems that consumed his presidential energies and by his patrician out-
look and privileged background. The combined impact of these factors is
evident in his Constitution Day speech of 1937. "Tolerance and concern
for fair play are virtues which do not flourish in the stony soil of economic
want and social distress," he told his audience at the Antietam battlefield
in Maryland. "Those of us whose circumstances have been cast in fortu-
nate lots are too prone to bear with fortitude the hardships of a goodly
portion of our fellow countrymen and women." I
* Associate Professor of Political Science, University of California, San Diego. B.A., 1966,
Antioch College; M.A., 1970, Ph.D., 1973, Boston University; J.D., 1978, Harvard Law School.
I. Quoted in ROOSEVELT AND FRANKFURTER 415-16 (M. FREEDMAN ann. 1967). The only refer-
ence in this speech to the problem of "non-discrimination against minorities" came in Roosevelt's
profession that he was "most happy at the effectiveness" of current judicial protection of "minority
rights." Id. at 414.
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Roosevelt's view of "fair play" as the core value of the constitutional
system bore the marks of his Groton chapel lessons and of exhortations on
its playing fields. But his commitment to the "rules of the game" as a
guiding principle of public behavior gave little solace to the victims of
official lawlessness. Not once in his speech at Antietam, an occasion and
place that called for a forthright statement, did Roosevelt defend the
rights of the black Americans over whose status as slaves the Civil War
had been waged. Speaking in a state that bordered the symbolic Mason-
Dixon line, and that held its black citizens in the grip of Jim Crow laws,
the President voiced the code words of segregation. "The Bill of Rights is
precious to all of us," he first stated in a ritual nod to the constitutional
decalogue. "The reserved powers of the States to deal with matters of
purely local concern are also precious," he immediately assured those
who might fear any federal assault on their local "customs" and laws. 2
Singling out this speech as being representative of Roosevelt's public
statements on civil rights and liberties is not unfair. In such remarks he
rarely ventured beyond the safe redoubt of platitude, in sharp contrast to
his pointed and often personal barbs at those who disputed the wisdom of
the New Deal recovery program. 3 Partisanship offers a partial explanation
for this rhetorical disparity. Critics on economic issues were largely, al-
though by no means exclusively, Republicans, and Roosevelt seemed to
revel in excoriation of the GOP minority in Congress and its big-business
backers. 4 His habitual avoidance of specific reference to racial and civil
liberties issues reflected, at least in part, the political reality of Dixiecrat
domination of the Congress .5
2. Quoted in id. at 416. Roosevelt also assuaged the states' rights sentiments of his listeners by
denouncing the Reconstruction-era Congress as a "callous majority" that had been responsible for
"the agony of our Southern States in the period after the War between the States .. (.. - Id at 414.
This evocation of Confederate terminology and mythology could hardly have heartened those who
looked to Roosevelt for leadership on civil rights.
3. In his Antietam speech, for example, Roosevelt barely masked his criticism of "the Supreme
Court Odd Man" who had held that "state minimum wage laws for women were unconstitutional."
Id. at 410. In this clear reference to Supreme Court Justice Owen Roberts, Roosevelt noted that
Roberts had recently confessed that for "twenty years he had been wrong" on this issue. Id. at 410.
This was an obvious reminder of Roberts' "switch-in-time-that-saved-nine" vote in West Coast Ho-
tel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
4. During his first presidential term, Roosevelt had in fact courted business support and muted
his attacks on congressional critics. When this strategy failed to muster GOP support for his recovery'
program, Roosevelt lashed out in the 1936 election campaign against the "economic royalists" who
sought a "new industrial dictatorship." Quoted in W. LEUCHTENBURG. FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND
THE NEW DEAL 183-84 (1963); see also A. SCHLESINGER. JR. THE POLITICS OF UPHEAVAL 638-39
(1960).
5. See H. SITKOFF. A NEW DEAL FOR BLACKS 40-45, 284, 286-88. 292-94 (1978). This is the
best existing treatment of relations between blacks and the Roosevelt administration. Chapter I I
deals with the campaign for an anti-lynching bill and chapter 9 deals with the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and its legal strategy to end segregation.
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Partisan factors alone, however, cannot fully explain Roosevelt's con-
tinuing failure to confront directly the civil rights and liberties issues that
persisted throughout his presidential tenure. Compassion for the poor and
powerless he had in full measure, and as Chief Executive he did not
shrink from pursuing the maximum exertion of federal power on behalf of
this "forgotten" constituency. Uppermost in the minds of those who
framed the Bill of Rights, Roosevelt told his Antietam audience, was the
conviction that fulfillment of these rights required "a central government,
strong enough to avert economic chaos." ' 6 But at the same time, he be-
lieved firmly in states' rights, and in particular in the responsibility of
state and local government for law enforcement. The concept of a federal
mandate for the protection of racial and political minorities was simply
outside his Jeffersonian notion of the proper allocation of federal and state
powers.
This brief sketch of Roosevelt's basic conception of the constitutional
structure of the American governmental system is intended as a prologue
to the discussion in this article of several of the more significant civil
rights and liberties issues and episodes during the period from 1933 to
1945. The definitional problem in such an undertaking is complex. For
the sake of brevity, this article will deal primarily with issues arising from
claims of abridgment of rights protected by the first amendment and the
Civil War amendments, and will stress those rights arguably protected by
federal statute or by direct constitutional proscription. However, the con-
cepts of civil rights and liberties are fluid and subject to considerable de-
bate over their scope and content. Thus, a more practical rule of thumb
will be employed: this article will focus on episodes that prompted an
organization such as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) or the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)
to complain that the Roosevelt administration was derelict in protecting
what these groups viewed as civil rights and liberties. 7 These outcries,
after all, focused the attention of the public, the press, and government
officials on a case or problem and gave historical import to the issues
involved.
The central focus of this article is on the role played in these episodes
by the U.S. Department of Justice, the primary federal agency entrusted
with law enforcement duties and powers. In particular, the role of the
attorney general as the department's titular head and as the personification
of federal enforcement of civil rights and liberties provides this article
6. Quoted in ROOSEVELT AND FRANKFURTER, supra note 1, at 415.
7. Facts about civil rights and liberties violations, and expressions of the views of these organiza-
tions, can be found in the annual reports of the ACLU and in THE CRIsis. the monthly publication of
the NAACP.
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with its analytic framework. A recent press commentary put this crucial
cabinet post in perspective: "More than anyone but the President himself,
it is the Attorney General who sets the moral tone of an Administration,
symbolizing its commitment or lack of commitment to impartial jus-
tice." 8 The four men who served Franklin Roosevelt in this post-Homer
Cummings, Frank Murphy, Robert Jackson. and Francis Biddle-
spanned the spectrum in the "moral tone" that each imposed on the de-
partment's approach to civil rights and liberties, from the virtual uncon-
cern shown by Cummings to the passionate moralism and activism with
which Murphy invested his office.
President Roosevelt allowed his attorneys general to function with con-
siderable autonomy. Although the President took an active interest in fed-
eral judicial appointments 9 and in candidates for the patronage post of
United States Attorney in the federal districts, he rarely intervened in the
litigation decisions of the Justice Department.' 0 Roosevelt and his White
House staff were kept informed of developments in significant or politi-
cally sensitive cases, but with the Justice Department Roosevelt displayed
less of his penchant for meddling in the affairs of cabinet agencies than
with most others. I I Within the context of the President's ultimate reponsi-
bility for the acts and policies of his subordinates, the Roosevelt record in
civil rights and liberties is, then, more properly viewed as the separate
records of his four attorneys general.
LYNCH MOBS AND LABOR VIOLENCE-THE ERA OF HOMER
CUMMINGS
Homer S. Cummings became attorney general by accident. Roosevelt
had named Senator Thomas Walsh, a progressive Montana Democrat, to
this post, but Walsh died two days before the presidential inauguration. 12
Rather than leave the cabinet incomplete while he searched for a distin-
guished replacement, Roosevelt hastily reached into the ranks of his polit-
ical allies and tapped Cummings, who had been slated for the post of
governor-general of the Phillippines. 13
8. Taylor, Ties ofAttorneys General to Chief. N.Y. Times. Jan. 30, 1984. at A 14. col. 3.
9. F. BIDDLE. IN BRIEF AUTHORITY 192-204 (1962) (Attorney General Biddle describes many
instances of Roosevelt's involvement in decisions about judicial nominations).
10. Id. at 191. Roosevelt did, on occasion, take a personal interest in cases that affected his
economic recovery program. meeting with government lawyers to discuss litigation decisions. See P
IRONS. THE NEw DEAL LAWYERS 39 (1982).
I1. See F. BIDDLE. supra note 9, at 191.
12. N.Y. Times, March3. 1933, at I,col. 3.
13. DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 137 (Supp. 6. 1980). There is no full-length biography
of Cummings. In his book about the Justice Department, H. CUMMINGS & C. MCFARLAND. FEDIRAI
JUSTICE (1937). he made no reference to civil rights and liberties problems during his tenure as
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Roosevelt was not the first and certainly not the last President to ap-
point an attorney general as a reward for faithful party service. Sixty-one
at the time he took office, Cummings was a Yale Law School graduate
who had combined private practice in Stamford, Connecticut, with an ac-
tive career in public service and party politics. 14 He played a key role as
Roosevelt's floor manager at the 1932 Democratic convention and
worked hard in the election campaign. 15 As a former county prosecutor,
Cummings brought a law-and-order perspective to the Justice Depart-
ment, tempered with a genuine concern for due process and the rights of
defendants. 16 But he was, at heart, a genial, gregarious politician more at
home in smoke-filled rooms and on the golf course than with the angry
advocates of civil rights and liberties.
During his six years as attorney general, Cummings pursued one objec-
tive-crime control-with an obsessive zeal. At a time when the automo-
bile and telephone made it easy for criminals to travel and operate across
state lines, Cummings moved quickly and with great success in persuad-
ing Congress to expand vastly his department's law enforcement powers.
In his official report for 1934, he boasted of his lobbying prowess and its
results "in curbing the activities of notorious murderers, kidnappers,
gangsters, bank robbers and extortionists engaged in desparate interstate
enterprises.' '17
In his anti-crime crusade, Cummings was more than willing to press
the department's existing powers to their limits and to seek even more
authority over matters that were traditionally state and local concerns. But
he retreated to the states' rights argument when confronted with demands
that he take action against lynching. Roosevelt's election had given hope
to those groups, led by the NAACP, which had vainly sought for years
the enactment of a federal anti-lynching law. 18 The campaign for the law
became a crusade in 1933, spurred by national revulsion at a wave of
brutal lynchings (twenty-eight during the year). Its proponents united
attorney general. The most important of his writings and official documents are collected in SELECTED
PAPERS OF HOMER CUMMINGS (C. Swisher ed. 1939).
14. Cummings had been a three-term mayor of Stamford, an unsuccessful candidate for the
United States House and Senate, and a Democratic national committeeman from 1900 to 1925. DIC-
TIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY. supra note 13, at 137.
15. Id.
16. In 1924, when Cummings was state's attorney for Fairfield County, Connecticut, a vagrant
was indicted for the murder of a Catholic priest. Despite a confession in the case, Cummings became
convinced of the defendant's innocence after a scrupulous investigation, and in a "gripping court-
room scene" gained dismissal of the indictment. Id.
17. Quoted in N.Y.Times, Jan. 2, 1935, at 10, col. 6.
18. H. SrrKoF. supra note 5, at 279-80.
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behind a bill introduced by Senators Edward Costigan of Colorado and
Robert Wagner of New York. ' 9
While the anti-lynching coalition organized its lobbying effort, and
sought Roosevelt's aid in breaking the expected Southern filibuster in the
Senate, three black youths were lynched in Alabama in August, 1933.
This crime prompted civil rights leaders to demand federal prosecution of
the Tuscaloosa County sheriff for turning the victims over to the mob. 20
A delegation headed by Walter White, the NAACP's executive secretary,
met with Attorney General Cummings on August 24. The delegation
pointed out to Cummings a federal statute which made it a criminal of-
fense for a person acting "under color of any law" to deprive another "of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitu-
tion and laws of the United States .... ",21 The visitors reminded the
attorney general that the sheriff's action had deprived the lynched youths
of their lives, in violation of the fourteenth amendment.
The demand for prosecution in this case was largely symbolic, in view
of the maximum penalty provided under the statute, a one-year prison
term or $1000 fine. What the delegation undoubtedly hoped, rather than
to obtain the sheriff's indictment, was to sensitize Cummings to the issue
and to enlist his support for the Costigan-Wagner bill. Cummings' re-
sponse left Walter White with a feeling of outrage: "The attorney general
was suave; he would make no commitment; he called for a brief. ' ' 22 As
Cummings had asked, the civil rights groups prepared and sent to him a
lengthy brief which argued the applicability of the federal statute, section
52 of the criminal code, to state and local officials dealing with lynch
mobs. According to White, the attorney general simply informed the del-
egation several months later that "the department did not intend to take
any action" in the Tuscaloosa case. 23
19. Id. at 280-88; see also Hearings on S. 1978 Before the Senate JudiciarY Committee, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
20. White, U.S. Department of(White) Justice, THE CRISIS, Oct. 1935 at 309.
21. Civil Rights Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 17, 16 Stat. 144 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 52 (1946))
(current version at 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1982)). For the history of this crucial statute, and an exhaustive
discussion of its use during the Roosevelt administration, see R. CARR. FEDERAL PROTECTION OF CIVIL
RIGHTS (1947). Carr notes that this statute had its origins in the Civil Rights Act of April 9. 1866, and
that prior to the Roosevelt administration it "had been involved in only two reported cases, both in
federal district courts." Id. at 70-71. Carr's invaluable book. which focuses on the activities of the
Civil Rights Section of the Justice Department, see infra text accompanying notes 60-85. is based on
access to Justice Department case files.
22. White, supra note 20, at 309.
23. Id. White noted with scom that Cummings did not reply directly but passed the message
through his executive assistant, William Stanley. White was also distressed that Cummings refused to
place the topic of lynching on the agenda of the National Crime Conference in December 1934,
despite Roosevelt's denunciation of lynching in his conference speech. Id. at 310.
698
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President Roosevelt genuinely abhorred lynching, which he denounced
in 1933 as "a vile form of collective murder." 24 But he put no political
muscle behind his verbal support for the Costigan-Wagner bill, limiting
his effort to the marshmallow statement that "the President will be glad to
see the bill pass and wishes it passed." 25 The Dixiecrats who controlled
the Senate quite predictably ignored this exhortation and killed both this
bill and its successors. 26 Attorney General Cummings took his cues on
this issue from the White House and matched Roosevelt in verbal eva-
sion. In August 1938 he told the sponsor of a House bill that would direct
the FBI to investigate lynching that he viewed the crime "with loathing,"
but that "the responsibility, so far as legislation is concerned, is primarily
and unmistakably with Congress.' '27 Like the President, Cummings
stayed on the sidelines as the battles over lynching raged during his six
years in office, an ineffective cheerleader in this one-sided contest with
enormous human and moral stakes.
The second major civil rights and liberties issue that arose during the
Cummings era in the Justice Department was that of violence and legal
repression directed at labor organizers and strikers. Backed by local po-
lice, National Guard troops, and the courts, employers had virtually
crushed the labor movement in the decade that preceded the New Deal 28
Heartened by the promise of federal legislation to ensure their rights to
organize and bargain collectively, millions of unorganized workers voted
for Roosevelt and, after his election, plastered factory gates with appeals
that "The President Wants You to Join the Union.''29 Congress
24. Quoted in H. SrrKOFF. supra note 5, at 280. Roosevelt was responding to the November 1933
lynching of two white men in San Jose, California, which "set off a nation-wide protest that the
NAACP used to launch its campaign" for the Costigan-Wagner bill. Id. It is an ironic historical
parallel that thirty years later, President Lyndon Johnson did not pressure Congress for passage of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 until two white civil rights workers were murdered in Alabama. R. EVANS
& R. NOVAK, LYNDON B. JOHNSON: THE EXERCISE OF POWER. 493-97 (1966).
25. Quoted in id. at 283.
26. Id. at 284-97. After Congress adjourned in 1934 without voting on the Costigan-Wagner
bill, presidential assistant Louis Howe wrote a note on his copy of the bill: "Not favored at this
time-may create hostility to other crime bills." Quoted in id. at 284.
27. Quoted in N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1938, at 38, col. 5. This bill would not have made lynching
a federal crime but would merely have provided for investigations at the direction of the attorney
general.
28. R. GOLDSTEIN. POLITICAL REPRESSION IN MODERN AMERICA 183-91 (1978). Spanning the
period from the 1870's to the 1970's, this book exhaustively documents private and public repression
against labor, political dissidents, and the members of racial and religious minorities. Goldstein notes
that the 1920's were the heyday of the anti-strike injunction; more than 900 were issued by state and
federal courts during this decade. Id. at 183; see also I. BERNSTEIN. THE LEAN YEARS (1960). This
book about the labor movement in the 1920's is another excellent source of data.
29. Quoted in P. IRONS. supra note 10, at 203. The anti-union campaign succeeded in reducing
the strength of organized labor from four million members in 1920 to less than half that number in
1933. Id.
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responded to labor pressure by inserting into the National Industrial Re-
covery Act (NIRA), passed in 1933, the requirement in section 7(a) that
employers permit workers to "organize and bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing" over issues of wages, hours, and
working conditions. 30
Hailed as "Labor's Bill of Rights," section 7(a) triggered an intense
but short-lived labor organizing campaign that foundered on the rocks of
employer resistance. Along with competition from company unions, the
discharge of union members, infiltration by labor spies, and the wide-
spread refusal of employers to recognize unions, those who tried to "or-
ganize the unorganized" encountered Justice Department reluctance to
seek judicial enforcement of section 7(a). 31 Francis Biddle, whose initial
New Deal post was chairman of the first National Labor Relations Board,
often bickered with Attorney General Cummings over Justice Department
foot-dragging in enforcement cases. 32 Cummings found fault with every
case prepared by Biddle's board and took only a handful before the con-
servative federal judges who struck down New Deal statutes with undis-
guised hostility. 33
Justice Department obstruction was only one of the factors that made
section 7(a) a victim of the business counteroffensive against unions in
the 1933-36 period. 34 State and locai officials proved to be equally
unwilling to protect organizers and striking workers, and were often eager
to intervene on the side of the employers. The clashes of strikers and pol-
icemen at picket lines resulted in more than eighteen thousand arrests be-
tween 1933 and 1936, and over one hundred strikers were killed in labor
disputes during this period. 35 Only a year after Roosevelt took office, the
ACLU had shifted from praise of his labor program to bitter criticism and
condemnation of federal officials for siding with employers. 36
30. National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA). ch. 90, § 7(a), 48 Stat. 195, 198 (1933) (current
version at 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982)). Roosevelt had opposed the inclusion of § 7(a) in the NIRA. and
agreed to it only after labor leaders threatened to call a general strike if he resisted. See P. IRONS.
supra note 10. at 204.
3 1. P. IRONS, supra note 10, at 208-10.
32. Id. at 221-25.
33. Id. at 218-20.
34. A well-financed legal campaign against both the NIRA and the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA), organized by the American Liberty League, crippled enforcement of both statutes until the
Supreme Court upheld the NLRA in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.. 301 U.S. 1 (1937). P.
IRONS. supra note 10, at 81, 243-48.
35. GOLDSTEIN. supra note 28, at 218.
36. In its 1933-34 annual report the ACLU complained that "'the New Deal administration has
refused to interfere in this industrial strife to make good its implied support of trade unionism.'"
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION. LIBERTY UNDER THE NEW DEAL 3 (1934). Two years later, the
ACLU saw little improvement in the record of the Roosevelt administration, citing "'the resort to
700
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The bloody 1934 San Francisco general strike put the Roosevelt admin-
istration to the first real test of its labor sympathies. Led by Harry
Bridges, the longshoremen, whose waterfront strike spread across the
city, fought battles with the police, leaving two strikers dead and hun-
dreds injured. 37 Employer groups appealed to the federal government for
National Guard intervention. General Hugh Johnson, the bombastic Na-
tional Recovery Adminstration director; supported military force to break
the strike and rushed to San Francisco. There he likened the situation to
"civil war" and urged conservative union leaders, who backed the gen-
eral strike but also feared Bridges as a radical, to "run these subversive
influences out from their ranks like rats." 38
Although the Justice Department played no direct role in the San Fran-
cisco strike, Attorney General Cummings advised Roosevelt that the
President had federal statutory authority to employ Army troops against
the strikers and to declare martial law in the area. Frances Perkins, the
Labor Secretary whose moderate counsel ultimately prevailed, met with
Cummings and "pleaded that this was in no way an alarming situation"
that required a military response. "I thought it unwise," she reported
telling Cummings, "to begin the Roosevelt administration by shooting it
out with working people who were only exercising their rights . . . to
organize and demand collective bargaining. ,,39 Federal troops remained
in their barracks and the general strike fizzled out when craft union lead-
ers withdrew their support from Bridges and his longshoremen. 4 0
Though Cummings was willing to dispatch armed forces against strik-
ing workers in San Francisco, he was reluctant to dispatch Justice Depart-
ment lawyers to investigate claims of civil rights and liberties violations
around the nation. One case in which he did order an inquiry involved
charges that sharecroppers and tenant farmers on the cotton plantations of
eastern Arkansas were held in peonage and subjected to violent reprisals
for striking against planters. 41 The sharecroppers and tenants were
force and violence by employers" as one of the greatest threats to labor and civil liberties. AMERICAN
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, How GOES THE BILLOF RIGHTS? 5 (1936).
37. A lengthy account of the strike is found in C. LARROWE. HARRY BRIDGES 62-94 (1972); see
also infra text accompanying notes 88-106 for a discussion of the later effort to deport Bridges.
38. C. LARROWE, supra note 37, at 85. Johnson was in San Francisco to give a speech and barged
into the volatile situation without any official role.
39. F. PERKINS, THE RoosEvELT I KNEw 314 (1946). Perkins reports that Roosevelt deliberately
avoided taking sides in the strike or making any public statement about it. Id. at 312-15..
40. See C. LARRO\E. supra note 37, at 62-94 (discussing generally the developments of the
strike).
41. For an account of the early years of the Southem Tenant Farmers Union (STFU), see D.
GRUBBS, CRY FROM THE COTTON (1971). The efforts of lawyers in the Agricultural Adjustment Ad-
ministration, the federal agency with jurisdiction over labor relations between growers and
farmworkers, to aid the STFU and southern sharecroppers are discussed in P. IRONS. supra note 10, at
164-73.
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members of the biracial Southern Tenant Farmers Union (STFU). Re-
peated complaints by STFU leaders and their northern liberal allies
prompted Cummings in June 1936 to order an investigation of allegations
that striking cotton choppers were being fined for vagrancy and then
"forced to work at the point of guns to pay off these fines. "42
Cummings authorized the Arkansas investigation with an eye toward
enforcement of the federal Antipeonage Act, the modern version of a Re-
construction statute designed to protect former slaves from a form of
forced labor that resulted from perpetual indebtedness. 43 As early as
1914, the Supreme Court had held that certain state laws violated the An-
tipeonage Act. 44 Nonetheless, the Justice Department had rarely taken
advantage of the Antipeonage Act to pursue widely alleged abuses, and
the STFU and its supporters hailed Cummings' announcement. The spe-
cial assistant he dispatched to Arkansas, Sam Whittaker, not only investi-
gated the peonage charges but also the claims that members of the STFU
staff had been beaten and flogged. 45 The outcome of the federal inquiry
disheartened the STFU and its supporters. The Whittaker investigation,
Cummings announced to the press in August 1936, "failed to reveal any
violation of Federal statutes.' '46 The facts uncovered by Whittaker, added
the attorney general, would be turned over to Arkansas officials for possi-
ble state action. Not surprisingly, no state prosecutions were forthcom-
ing.
The Arkansas turmoil had one result that later prompted Cummings to
initiate the only major prosecution under federal civil rights laws during
his tenure in office. Dismayed by the ineffective Arkansas probe, Gardner
Jackson, an untiring activist who organized support for the STFU and
other liberal causes, turned his efforts from the executive to the legislative
branch of the federal government. Jackson persuaded Senator Robert La-
Follette, Jr., the Wisconsin Progressive, to introduce a resolution to au-
thorize a congressional investigative body with jurisdiction over civil
42. N.Y. Times. June 4, 1936. at 4. col. 6. The strikers demanded wages of $1.50 for a ten-hour
day, rather than the 75 cents they were receiving. Id.
43. 18 U.S.C. § 444 (1935) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1581 (1982)). This revision of the
Reconstruction-era Peonage Abolition Act imposed a fine of not more than $5000. or not more than
five years in prison, or both, for holding any person in "a condition of peonage." Id. In 1905, the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the act in Clyatt v. United States. 197 U.S. 207 (1905).
The Court defined peonage as "a status or condition of compulsory service, based upon the indebted-
ness of the peon to the master." Id. at 215. For a discussion of the statute's history and use by the
Roosevelt administration, see R. CARR. supra note 21. at 77-80, 180-82.
44. United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133 (1914) (invalidating Alabama laws allowing a per-
son fined upon conviction for a misdemeanor to confess judgment with a surety in the amount of the
fine and agree with the surety. in consideration of the surety's payment of the fine, to reimburse him
by working for him).
45. N.Y. Times, June 19, 1936, at 15, col. 1.
46. Quoted in N.Y. Times. Aug. 13, 1936, at 19. col. 6.
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liberties issues. 47 The Senate passed the resolution in June 1936 and Se-
nator Hugo Black, who chaired the Committee on Education and Labor,
appointed LaFollette to head a three-member subcommittee that became
popularly known as the LaFollette Civil Liberties Committee.48
The LaFollette Committee devoted its first year to exposure of the "la-
bor spy" network that spread across the country and was funded by anti-
union employers to the tune of several million dollars a year. 49 In 1937,
LaFollette turned his attention to labor violence in Harlan County, Ken-
tucky, where for the past six years coal miners had fought for recognition
of their union, the United Mine Workers of America. 50 Coal operators in
"Bloody Harlan" owned the county sheriff, Theodore Middleton, whose
deputies patrolled the mining camps with machine guns. Between 1934
and 1937 thirty-seven of Middleton's deputies were convicted of felonies
and sixty-four were indicted at least once.51
LaFollette began hearings on the Harlan County situation in April
1937, just two weeks after the Supreme Court upheld the National Labor
Relations Act in the Jones & Laughlin case.52 The combination of the
well-publicized hearings and judicial approval of labor's rights to orga-
nize free of employer interference had an obvious impact on the Justice
Department. On May 19, 1937, Attorney General Cummings issued a
press release that announced his dispatch of FBI agents to Harlan County
with orders to investigate complaints of "violence and terrorism" in the
troubled area. "If the investigation discloses offenses under Federal juris-
diction," Cummings stated, "vigorous and prompt prosecution will fol-
low." 53
Based on evidence collected by the FBI and presented to the LaFollette
Committee, Cummings authorized the prosecution of more than fifty de-
fendants, including sixteen coal companies, eighteen company operators,
47. J. AUERBACH. LABOR AND LIBERTY 43-47, 62-73 (1966). Auerbach's book provides a thor-
ough and sympathetic history of the LaFollette Committee. He notes as well the contributions of
Heber Blankenhorn, an investigator for the NLRB, in pressing for the Senate investigating commit-
tee. Id. at 59-73.
48. Id. at 75. Senators Elbert Thomas and Louis Murphy were also named to the subcommittee;
Murphy died shortly after his appointment and was not replaced until 1939. Id.
49. Id. at 97-115. For a list of reports issued by the LaFollette Committee, see id. at 221.
50. Id. at 115-20. Violence against the Harlan County miners reached such levels that a special
commission, appointed by Governor A. B. Chandler in 1935, reported that it was "almost unbeliev-
able that anywhere in a free and democratic Nation ... conditions can be found as bad as they are in
Harlan County. There exists a virtual reign of terror . I.." d. at 116.
51. Id.atI17-18.
52. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1(1937).
53. Quoted in N.Y. Times, May 20, 1937, at 3, col. 5. Cummings attributed his move to the
revelations of the LaFollette Committee and to complaints by John L. Lewis, president of the United
Mine Workers and chairman of the Committee for Industrial Organization. Id.
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and twenty-two deputy sheriffs. 54 They were indicted under the Recon-
struction-era statute that made it a crime for two or more persons to con-
spire to deprive any citizen of rights secured by the Constitution or federal
law. 55 Tried in 1938, the Harlan County cases ended in a mistrial after a
hung jury. The defendants were not retried, but Justice Department and
other federal officials persuaded coal operators to end their reign of terror
against the miners and the union organizing campaign. 56
It seems clear that Cummings bowed to public and political pressure in
approving federal prosecution in the Harlan County case. Still, his reluc-
tant use of the federal civil rights laws did set a precedent that his succes-
sors followed with more vigorous action. The Cummings era in the Jus-
tice Department spanned six years marked by widespread violence and
official oppression visited on blacks and union members. The statutory
enforcement tools available to federal prosecutors were weak and lacked
firm judicial sanction. Nonetheless, Cummings made no move to
strengthen these tools and failed almost totally to set a "moral tone" of
support for civil rights and liberties. The "accidental" attorney general
left his post in 1939 with a record of failed opportunity.
BRUTALITY AND BIGOTS-TURNING THE SCREWS OF
ENFORCEMENT
Each of the three men who followed Homer Cummings as attorney
general in the Roosevelt administration proclaimed a determination to en-
force the civil rights laws to their fullest extent. A number of political
factors-the rightward turn of Congress, looming war clouds and the en-
suing global conflict, and the concomitant fear of "subversive" and "dis-
loyal" groups in American society-placed obstacles in the path of im-
partial enforcement. The impact of these factors produced lapses in the
records of Cummings' successors that cannot be ignored or excused. 57
But on the whole, the final six years of the Roosevelt era were marked by
54. See R. CARR. supra note 21, at 27.
55. The Enforcement Actof 1870, ch. 114, §6, 16Stat. 141 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §51 (1946))
(current version at 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1982)). This law was designed to enforce the thirteenth amend-
ment. The statute provided a stiff maximum penalty of ten years in prison and a fine of not more than
$5000, in contrast to the one-year term and $1000 fine provided for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 52. see
infra note 21. See R. CARR, supra note 21. at 57-70 for a discussion of the history of § 51 and its use
by the Roosevelt administration.
56. R. CARR. supra note 21, at 27-28. Justice Department pressure led the coal operators to sign
a contract with the United Mine Workers in order to avoid a retrial. J. AUERBACH. supra note 47. at
120. The report of the LaFollette Committee on the Harlan County situation is in SENATE COMMTrrEE
ON EDUCATION AND LABOR. PRIVATE POLICE SYSTEMS. S. REP. No 6, Part 2, 76th Cong., Ist Sess.
(1939).
57. See supra text accompanying notes 88-143 for discussion of these issues.
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a vastly improved Justice Department record in the area of civil rights and
liberties.
It is impossible to say whether President Roosevelt selected Frank
Murphy to succeed Cummings with the intention to restore the "moral
tone" that could be set by the attorney general. Murphy was a loyal New
Deal politician who needed a job, having been defeated for reelection as
governor of Michigan in the 1938 electoral debacle of Democrats in both
Congress and the states. 58 Murphy was rewarded, as Cummings had
been, for faithful party service. But this was the only characteristic the
two men shared. More than any attorney general in American history,
Murphy brought to the post a crusading spirit and a passionate moralism
that reflected his former membership on the NAACP board of directors
and his hatred of racial and religious prejudice. 59
Murphy wasted no time in charting a new course for the Justice Depart-
ment. On February 3, 1939, less than a month after he assumed office, he
created a new departmental body, first called the Civil Liberties Unit and
later retitled and more widely known as the Civil Rights Section (CRS).
In announcing this move, Murphy stressed that "an important function of
the law enforcement branch of government is the aggressive protection of
fundamental rights inherent in a free people." He promised to "pursue a
program of vigilant action in the prosecution" of those who infringed
constitutional and federal statutory rights. 60 The small but dedicated
group of lawyers assigned to the CRS immediately began to review the
existing body of federal law with the aim of finding a solid basis for en-
forcement. They also began selecting cases for prosecution from the
backlog of complaints that had piled up in the department, and from the
wave of complaints that flowed in after the publicity given to Murphy's
statement. 61
58. Murphy, born in 1893, gained "a lasting hatred for 'industrial slavery' "during his boyhood
work in a starch factory. CURRENT BIOGRAPHY 610 (M. Block ed. 1940). He served for three years as
an assistant United States attorney and sat as a municipal judge before his election as mayor of Detroit
in 1930. Roosevelt appointed him as governor general of the Philippines (the post for which Homer
Cummings had been slated) in 1932. During his term as governor of Michigan, his refusal to employ
troops to oust the General Motors "sitdown" strikers cost him conservative support, while his early
threat to use force cost him labor votes in 1938. Id.; see also S. FINE. FRANK MURPHY: THE DETROIT
YEARS (1975); J. HOWARD. MR. JUSTICE MURPHY (1968).
59. H. SrrKoFF, supra note 5, at 66. Murphy's status as an Irish Catholic affected his views on
civil rights and liberties. John Pickering, who served as law clerk to Murphy on the Supreme Court,
recently stated that Murphy "had a terrible streak of religious fervor in him, and felt very strongly
about religious freedom and race." Quoted in P. IRONS. JUSTICE AT WAR 243 (1983).
60. Quotedin R. CARR. supra note 21, at I.
61. Id. at 33-34, 56-57; see also Schweinhaut, The Civil Liberties Section of the Department of
Justice, I BILLOF RIGHTS REv. 206 (1941). Henry Schweinhaut headed the CRS from 1939 to 1941,
followed by Victor Rotnem from 1941 to 1945.
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The new attorney general had an acute perception, as a veteran of local
and state service during the Depression decade, of the fact that civil rights
and liberties were most often infringed by officials at these lower levels of
government. Taking the stump at the May 1934 meeting of the United
States Conference of Mayors, Murphy combined an impassioned plea for
cooperation with a chiding lecture to his former colleagues. Noting that
his department had received "a steady deluge of letters complaining that
civil liberties have been abridged" by local police and officials. Murphy
summed up these informal petitions as an indictment of his listeners:
They indicate clearly that some public officials have used their power arbi-
trarily: that ordinances have been passed and invoked that are oppressive
and unjust and violate common right; that citizens have been denied the
right to express freely their opinions and to worship as they please: and that
some have been prevented from petitioning their government for the redress
of grievances. 62
Murphy did not need to remind his audience that each count of this indict-
ment was leveled particularly at one mayor who was conspicuously ab-
sent from the meeting, Frank Hague of Jersey City. Determined to keep
labor organizers out of his fiefdom, Hague's compliant city council had
enacted ordinances that gave city officials unbridled discretion to ban
picketing on city streets. Jersey City police had arrested hundreds of those
who defied the ordinances. This volatile situation gave a special emphasis
to Murphy's statement that "the first battleground of civil liberties is the
local communities."- 63 The mayors could hardly have missed the point
when the Supreme Court, in an opinion handed down just three weeks
after Murphy spoke, struck down the Jersey City ordinances as an in-
fringement of constitutional rights secured by the fourteenth amendment
and protected by federal statute. 64
62. Quoted in N.Y. Times. May 16. 1939. at 16. col. 2. The Times, which editorially corn-
mended Murphy for his speech. professed an inability to "put as much conlidence as Mr. Murphy
does" in the prospect of effective federal and state enforcement of civil liberties, noting the pre-
valence of state criminal syndicalism laws and similar repressive statutes. N.Y. Times. May 17.
1939. at 22. col. 2.
63. Quoted in id., May 16. 1939. at 16, col. 2. The ACLU. in its 1938 annual report. singled out
Jersey City as the only large city where "'practically all meeting places [are] closed to organizations
opposed by the authorities." AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, ETERNAL VIGILANCE! 43 (1938)
64. Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939). The Court based its ruling on the
Civil Rights Act of April 20, 1871. which subjected "any person" who acted "under color of any
law" to deprive another of rights protected under the Constitution to a suit for damages or equitable
relief. Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22. § 1. 17 Stat. 13 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 43 (1941)J (current
version at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. V 1981)). This judicial approval of the civil counterpart to § 52
of the federal criminal law obviously strengthened the hand of Justice Department lawyers in bringing
criminal prosecutions against state and local officials.
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Although the Justice Department had not been a party to the Jersey City
case, the Supreme Court decision gave heart to lawyers in the CRS and
prompted them to press for federal prosecution of local officials who
acted "under color of law" in denying protected civil rights. Given the
lead-time required for the preparation of such cases, only a handful were
brought during the year that Murphy served as attorney general. Con-
scious of the depth of black frustration at the failure of the anti-lynching
campaign, CRS lawyers decided to focus on police brutality cases. As
their first target, they selected an Atlanta policeman, William Sutherland,
accused of extracting a confession from a black prisoner with an electric
"tacking iron," a third-degree method that left the victim severely
burned. 65
Revulsion at the torture inflicted by Sutherland led the local United
States Attorney to recommend federal prosecution, despite the police-
man's earlier acquittal in state court. In March 1940 a federal grand jury
issued an indictment based on section 52 of the criminal code, charging
the defendant with acting "under color of law" in depriving the victim of
his rights to due process and equal protection of the laws. Justice Depart-
ment lawyers won a legal victory when the federal judge overruled a de-
murrer to the indictment based on the argument that a policeman who had
clearly exceeded his statutory authority acted without official sanction
and was thus beyond the reach of federal law. The federal prosecutors
failed, however, to gain a conviction in two trials because of jury dis-
agreement; they finally dropped the case. 66 Justice Department lawyers
were not unsuccessful in all of the early police brutality cases. Another
prosecution begun in 1940, against an Arkansas deputy sheriff charged
with brutality against prisoners, ended with a conviction in 1942. CRS
lawyers were especially heartened in this case by an appellate decision
that sanctioned the use of section 52 in police brutality cases. 67
Federal civil rights prosecutions began in earnest when Frank Murphy
became attorney general. The "moral tone" he set in this area continued
under the two men who next held this post, although they lacked his fer-
vent commitment. Upon Murphy's nomination to the Supreme Court in
January 1940, President Roosevelt replaced him with Robert H. Jackson,
an upstate New York lawyer who had campaigned vigorously for Roose-
velt in 1932. Rewarded with the office of general counsel in the Bureau of
65. R. CARR, supra note 21, at 151-52.
66. Id. at 152-54. Carr, whose account of this case is based on the Justice Department file, noted
"a strong reluctance by the FBI" to conduct an investigation of a local police department. Unnamed
"higher authorities" in the Department sided with the FBI until CRS lawyers complained loudly. Id.
at 152-53; see infra note 87.
67. Id. at 154-55; Culp v. United States, 131 F.2d 93 (8th Cir. 1942).
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Internal Revenue, Jackson later moved to the Justice Department and be-
came solicitor general in 1938, serving under both Cummings and Mur-
phy.68 During his tenure as attorney general, Jackson supported the civil
rights enforcement program with considerably less fervor than Murphy. 69
Jackson did approve one notable prosecution in a voting rights case,
providing Justice Department lawyers with a long-sought judicial sanc-
tion. This case did not involve disenfranchised blacks, but rather a scan-
dal within the lily-white Louisiana Democratic party. Members of the
party's reform faction, in their zeal to oust the entrenched Long machine,
were caught stealing ballots during the bitter primary election and were
indicted under sections 51 and 52 of the federal criminal code. When the
federal district judge sustained demurrers to these charges, the govern-
ment appealed directly to the Supreme Court. 70 The significance of the
Court's ruling in the Classic case, 71 a narrow four-to-three decision
handed down in March 1941, did not lie in its reversal of the trial judge
on the section 51 charge. This part of the opinion merely extended to
congressional primaries an earlier ruling that dealt with fraudulent prac-
tices in general elections. 72 The Court broke new ground, however, in
holding that state officials who committed acts outside the scope of their
authority could be prosecuted under section 52, which did not require
proof of a conspiracy to infringe constitutional rights.73
With their most potent enforcement tool sharpened by the Supreme
Court, lawyers in the CRS wielded section 52 in a new round of police
brutality prosecutions. When Robert Jackson followed Frank Murphy to
the Supreme Court in June 1941, responsibility for this campaign fell on
Francis Biddle, the fourth and last attorney general to serve under Roose-
velt. Like his immediate predecessor, Biddle was elevated from the post
68. Jackson, born in 1892, spent twenty years in trial practice in Jamestown, N.Y., and became
"widely esteemed for his salty independence of mind and clear courtroom presentation." DIc-rIo-
NARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 357 (Supp. V 1977); see also E. GERHARDT. AMERICA'S ADVOCATE
(1958). Roosevelt, while governor of New York, appointed Jackson in 1930 to a state commission to
reform the judicial system. Id. Jackson also gained Roosevelt's favor with his vigorous 1937 Senate
testimony in defense of the President's "court-packing" plan. Id.
69. Albert E. Arent, a CRS lawyer who served under both Murphy and Jackson, recently stated
that Jackson "paid very little attention to our work and the old guard [in the Department] made it
frustrating for us." Letter from Arent to author (January 31, 1984) (copy on tile with the Washington
Law Review).
70. See R. CARR. supra note 21, at 85-94.
71. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
72. United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1915). See R. CARR. supra note 21, at 65-66. for a
discussion of this case.
73. "Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the
wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken 'under color of' state law."
Classic, 313 U.S. at 326.
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of solicitor general and was also a veteran of New Deal legal service. 74
Underneath the "casual" exterior noted by friends, Biddle had a core of
toughness and closely matched Murphy in his commitment to civil rights
and liberties.
Biddle later wrote proudly of his record in bringing prosecutions
against state officials "who had misused the power of office under 'color
of law' to deprive individuals of their rights." 75 He took a personal inter-
est in the case brought in 1943 against Claude Screws, a rural Georgia
sheriff who, joined by a deputy and a local policeman, beat to death a
handcuffed black prisoner arrested on a forged warrant. 76 After convic-
tion by a federal jury, Screws and his co-defendants received three-year
prison sentences. Biddle expressed pleasure that jury members "were not
deflected from doing their sworn duty by the usual charge of 'Yankee
interference.' "177
The conviction of the homicidal officers proved to be a Pyrhhic vic-
tory. After the verdicts were upheld by the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, 78 the Supreme Court agreed to review the cases and proceeded to
blunt the utility of section 52. Six justices supported the constitutionality
of the statute, but a five-member majority held that the trial judge had
erred in his jury instructions and ordered a new trial. Writing for the
Court, Justice William 0. Douglas stated that the law required the jury to
find that the defendants had "willfully" deprived their victim of a right
"made specific either by the express terms of the Constitution or laws of
the United States or by decisions interpreting them." ' 79 The import of
Douglas's opinion seemed to be that the jury must find that the defendants
had in mind the due process rights of their victim when they bludgeoned
him to death. Not suprisingly, Screws and his fellow officers were acquit-
ted on retrial, which led Biddle to complain that the results of the Screws
74. Biddle, born in 1886, graduated from Harvard Law School and served a clerkship with Jus-
tice Oliver Wendell Holmes. He spent twenty-three years in corporate practice in Philadelphia before
Roosevelt appointed him in 1934 as chairman of the first NLRB. Biddle also spent an unhappy year
as a federal circuit judge at Roosevelt's insistence. Unlike his predecessors as attorney general in the
Roosevelt administration, Biddle had been a Republican before his New Deal service and had had no
involvement in party politics. F. BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AurHoRrrY (1962) (Biddle recounts his experi-
ences in public service and as attorney general); see also P. IRONS. supra note 10, at 221.
75. F. BIDDLE. supra note 74, at 156.
76. Id. at 156-59. Robert Hall, the black victim, owned a pearl-handled pistol that one of
Screws' deputies coveted and took from Hall. On Hall's complaint, the county grand jury ordered the
pistol returned. In retaliation, Screws forged a warrant that charged Hall with theft of an automobile
tire. The officers who beat Hall to death were drunk and "boasted they were going to 'get' a Negro
who had 'lived too long' and got too smart." Id. at 157.
77. Id. at 157.
78. Screws v. United States, 140 F.2d 662 (5th Cir. 1944), rev'd, 325 U.S. 91 (1945); see also
R. CARR, supra note 21, at 106-15.
79. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 104 (1945).
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decision "was greatly to lessen the value of Section 52 in punishing atro-
cities of this character where the state refused to take action." 80
The Supreme Court also complicated the task of providing federal pro-
tection to members of the Jehovah's Witnesses sect, whose street-corner
preaching and door-to-door proselytizing had provoked hundreds of ar-
rests and the passage of many restrictive local ordinances. In June 1940
the Court upheld the action of a Pennsylvania school board in expelling
two young Witnesses who refused to salute the American flag. 8' Victor
Rotnem, a Civil Rights Section lawyer who headed the unit while Biddle
was attorney general, described the violent consequences of the Court's
opinion: "Between June 12 and June 20, 1940, hundreds of attacks upon
the Witnesses were reported to the Department of Justice. Several were of
such violence that it was deemed advisable to have the Federal Bureau of
Investigation look into them." 82
One of these violent reprisals against the Witnesses led to a successful
prosecution under section 52. When seven members of the sect arrived in
Richwood, West Virginia, in June 1940, they visited the Mayor's office
to seek police protection. They were promptly seized by a deputy sheriff,
forced to drink large doses of castor oil and taken out to face a mob of
1,500 hostile people. The deputy, who had removed his badge, then or-
dered the Witnesses to salute the flag, after which they were tied to a
rope, marched through the streets, and finally told to leave the town and
not to return. 8 3 Lawyers in the CRS brought charges against the deputy
sheriff and chief of police and secured convictions that were upheld by
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. 84
Overall, the Justice Department compiled a creditable record over the
last six years of the Roosevelt administration in cases that dealt with ra-
cial and religious minorities. Needless to say, the CRS was unable to
bring prosecutions in more than a handful of the cases referred to it.85
Many of these complaints were factually weak, many were settled
80. F. BIDDLE. supra note 74, at 159.
81. Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis. 310 U.S. 586 (19401. This decision was overruled in
West Virginia St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
82. Rotnem & Folsom, Recent Restrictions Upon Religious Liberty. 36 AMER POL SCI REV
1053, 1061 (1942). This article recounts several of the instances of church bumings and mob vio-
lence to which Witnesses were subjected.
83. For an account of this case, see R. CARR. supra note 21. at 134-35. 143-44. 155-59.
84. Catlette v. United States, 132 F.2d 902 (4th Cir. 1943). Finding that "the failure of Catlette
to protect the victims from group violence or to arrest the members of the mob who asaulted the
victims constituted a violation of his common law duty," the court placed his "'dereliction
squarely within the provisions" of§ 52. Id. at 907.
85. "More than eight thousand complaints that reached the CRS in 1942 resulted in only
seventy-six prosecutions; in 1943, over thirteen thousand complaints produced prosecutive action in
only sixty-one cases; and, in 1944, the twenty thousand complaints culminated in only sixty-four
prosecutions." R. CARR. supra note 21, at 129.
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without prosecution, some did not pass grand jury scrutiny, and others
that resulted in indictments were lost when juries refused to convict. The
Supreme Court's backing-and-filling in its statutory interpretation of sec-
tion 52 complicated the enforcement program. Institutional factors also
affected the work of CRS lawyers. "Certain career lawyers in the upper
echelons of the Justice Department were hostile to the program," one of
the CRS lawyers recently stated. 86 Resistance to civil rights enforcement
at lower levels, particularly within the FBI, additionally hampered efforts
to secure evidence against local officials and policemen. 87 Notwithstand-
ing these hobbles, CRS lawyers did their best to protect and enforce con-
stitutional rights.
COMMUNISM AND CONCENTRATION CAMPS-CIVIL RIGHTS
IN CRISIS
Balanced against the Roosevelt administration's efforts to protect the
civil rights and liberties of oppressed minorities are its egregious failures.
Among the episodes in which the Justice Department capitulated to politi-
cal pressure, three in particular stand out as examples of subordination of
the Constitution to the politics of paranoia. Each of these episodes-the
campaign to deport Harry Bridges, the prosecution of "seditious" critics
of American wartime policies, and the internment of Japanese Ameri-
cans-illustrate the dominance of politics over law when the two institu-
tions battle.
Harry Bridges was the victim of a unique political and legal vendetta
which lasted more than two decades. His troubles began in 1934, when
Bridges directed the San Francisco waterfront strike that spread across the
city and split the Roosevelt administration into hard-line and more moder-
ate factions. 88 Members of the Communistparty supported the strike and
made up a vocal and influential minority in the longshoremen's unionthat
Bridges headed. These connections, along with his openly radical views,
made Bridges the target of West Coast shipping interests and their allies
among local, state, and federal officials. Charges that the union leader
was a communist became a staple of hostile press comments and denunci-
ation by conservative politicians. 89
86. Letter from Arent to author (January 31, 1984) (copy on file with the Washington Law Re-
view).
87. See R. CARR, supra note 21, at 152-53. Carr noted, however, that the FBI and CRS
"worked together reasonably well" in later cases. Id. at 153.
88. See infra text accompanying notes 37-40.
89. See C. LARROWE. supra note 37, at 32-35, 56-59. Bridges recently admitted his political
affinity with Communist Party positions. "I agreed with the party 95 percent of the time. But I never
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As an alien, Bridges was especially vulnerable to legal attack. (Al-
though Bridges had twice taken out naturalization papers after his arrival
in the United States from his native Australia in 1920, he had let them
lapse each time before the deadlines set for formal application for Ameri-
can citizenship.) The first official move to seek his deportation began in
1937 on the initiative of the Seattle director of the Immigration and Na-
turalization Service (INS), an agency then part of the Labor Depart-
ment. 90 The INS official bombarded his Washington headquarters with
affidavits and police reports that alleged that Bridges was a communist.
Labor Secretary Frances Perkins sought Roosevelt's advice on whether to
bring deportation proceedings against Bridges under federal law. Accord-
ing to Perkins, Roosevelt dismissed the idea on civil liberties grounds. 9 1
Despite this presidential directive, mounting political pressure finally
forced Perkins to issue a deportation warrant against Bridges in March
1938. Her distaste for the crusade to deport Bridges was reflected in her
selection of James Landis to serve as trial examiner in the fact-finding
hearings mandated by INS regulation. Then the dean of Harvard Law
School, Landis upheld his reputation as a New Deal liberal in finding,
after an eleven-week hearing that produced a 152-page report submitted
in December 1939, that the evidence presented had not shown that
Bridges was currently either a member of or "affiliated" with the Com-
munist Party. 92
The conservative reaction to the Landis report took several forms. One
was an impeachment resolution filed against Perkins in the House of Rep-
resentatives, which scared the Secretary but went nowhere. 93 More im-
portant was the successful campaign to transfer the INS to the Justice
Department, which bypassed Perkins. The next move in the congres-
sional crusade involved a classic bill of attainder. This legislative billy-
club directed Attorney General Robert Jackson to deport Bridges "forth-
with to Australia" on the ground that his "presence in this country the
joined. They never asked me, and I never volunteered." Interview with Harry Bridges in San Fran-
cisco (January 8, 1984).
90. See C. LARROWE. supra note 37, at 138-42; F. PERKINS. supra note 39, at 316-17.
91. F. PERKINS. supra note 39, at 317-18. Secretary Perkins related her meeting with Roosevelt
to discuss the pressure to deport Bridges. The President asked if Bridges had "'done anything to
overthrow the Government." Perkins said he had not. -' 'Then why in the world.* asked the Presi-
dent, 'should a man be punished for what he thinks, for what he believes? That's against the Constitu-
tion.' "Id. at 318. This account strikes the author as somewhat disingenuous.
92. U.S. DEPARTMENTOF LABOR. IN THE MATTER OF HARRY R. BRIDGES (1939).
93. F. PERKINS, supra note 39, at 218-19; see 84 CONG REC 702-11 for the text of the impeach-
ment resolution, offered by J. Parnell Thomas, a New Jersey Republican. The House Judiciary Com-
mittee, controlled by the Democrats, reported unfavorably (and unanimously) on the resolution and it
was tabled by the House without debate on March 24, 1939. Id. at 3273.
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Congress deems hurtful. " 94 Jackson responded with a public letter de-
nouncing this bill as unconstitutional and notiig that Bridges "had been
accused, investigated, and tried at great length, and judgment has been
rendered that he had not been proved guilty of the charges made against
him. 95
Jackson's success in blocking passage of the bill of attainder proved to
be illusory. In June 1940, Bridges' leading congressional opponent, Sam
Hobbs, added to the Alien Registration Act-better known as the Smith
Act-a provision directing the deportation of aliens who "at any time"
after their arrival in the United States had been members of or "affili-
ated" with the Communist Party. 96 Hobbs thus circumvented Landis's
interpretation of the earlier statute and opened the door for renewed pro-
ceedings against Bridges. 97 Jackson promptly ordered the FBI to reopen
its investigation of the outspoken union leader, whose opposition to the
growing "preparedness" campaign put him at odds with the attorney
general's interventionist sentiments. 98 Announcing in February 1941 that
a 2,500 page FBI report contained "new and additional evidence" in the
case, Jackson issued a second deportation warrant and chose Charles B.
Sears, a retired New York State judge, to conduct a second round of hear-
ings. 99 Based largely on the testimony of two witnesses who had not ap-
peared at the prior hearings, both of them bitter union foes of Bridges,
Sears concluded after the ten-week session, in a 185-page report submit-
ted in September 1941, that Bridges was a Communist Party member and
should be deported to his native country. 100
The timing of the Sears report placed the burden of decision on Francis
Biddle, who had recently replaced Jackson as attorney general. Political
94. 86 CONG. REc. 8203.
95. N.Y. Times, June 20, 1940, at 12, col. 3. Although Jackson carefully stated that he did "not
now consider" whether the proposed legislation constituted a bill of attainder, was an ex post facto
law, or violated the due process clause of the fifth amendment, the tone of his letter left no doubt of
his position on these issues. Id.
96. Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 439, § 23, 54 Stat. 673 (1940).
97. Hobbs did not conceal his intention. "It is my joy to announce that this bill will do, in a
perfectly legal and constitutional manner, what the bill specifically aimed at the deportation of Harry
Bridges seeks to accomplish." 86 CONG. REC. 9031.
98. Jackson had recently, in August 1940, drafted an opinion for Roosevelt defending the le-
gality of the so-called "destroyers-for-bases" deal, which involved the transfer of fifty American
destroyers to Great Britain, despite the seeming prohibition of the Neutrality Act of 1917. See P.
GOODHART, FIFI-Y SHIPs THAT SAVED THE WORLD 60, 187-88 (1965).
99. N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1941, at 1, 15. Bridges responded that "this new-attack amounts to
persecution. How many times must a man be cleared of the same charge before they leave him
alone?"Id. at 15.
100. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MEMORANDUM OF DECISION IN THE MATTER OF HARRY REN-
TON BRIDGES (1941); see also C. LARROWE. supra note 37, at 226-37, for an account of the Sears
hearing.
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factors complicated Biddle's task. Three months before he received
Sears' deportation recommendation, Germany had invaded the Soviet
Union and Bridges had shifted to fervent support of the Allied cause. 101
Conscious of the pressures to overrule Sears and dismiss the warrant,
Biddle nonetheless decided-despite the unanimous opinion of the Board
of Immigration Appeals that the testimony accepted by Sears was sus-
pect-to order Bridges' deportation. 10 2 This decision upset President
Roosevelt, for whom politics almost always took precedence over law.
"I'm sorry to hear that," Roosevelt responded when Biddle informed
him of the decision. But the President knew that the judicial wheels
turned slowly. "I'll bet," he told Biddle, "that the Supreme Court will
never let him be deported. And the decision is a long way off." 103
Roosevelt's prediction was accurate on both counts. Three years
elapsed between the time Bridges was served with the deportation order
and the Supreme Court's decision in June 1945-two weeks after the
German surrender-to vacate the order. Writing for the five-member ma-
jority, Justice Douglas cut a narrow path of statutory interpretation, hold-
ing that Judge Sears had relied on unsworn testimony and had miscon-
strued the term "affiliation" in his report. 104 This evasion of the central
issue, that of the vendetta against Bridges for his labor militance and po-
litical views, provoked an acidulous concurrence from Justice Murphy,
directed both at Douglas and Biddle:
The record in this case will stand forever as a monument to man's intoler-
ance of man. Seldom if ever in the history of this nation has there been such
a concentrated and relentless crusade to deport an individual because he
dared to exercise the freedom that belongs to him as a human being and that
is guaranteed to him by the Constitution. 105
The crusade to deport Harry Bridges left a lasting stain on the record of
the Roosevelt administration. Despite his ultimate success in gaining
American citizenship, made possible after the Supreme Court reversed a
perjury conviction obtained by Truman's Justice Department, 10 6 Bridges
spent the better part of two decades before inquisitorial bodies and in
101. See F. BIDDLE. supra note 74, at 299.
102. Id. at 297-302. Biddle confessed that the evidence in the Sears report on the question of
Bridges' alleged Communist Party membership "was not overwhelming.' But he professed 'little
doubt" that Bridges was a Communist, and placed great emphasis in explaining his decision on "the
effect on the war effort that the removal of Bridges might have." Id at 300: see also C. LARROWE.
supra note 37, at 238-42
103. F. BIDDLE, supra note 74, at 302.
104. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 141-49. 150-56 (1945).
105. Id. at 157.
106. Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209 (1953). See also C. LARROWE. supra note 37 for an
account of Bridges' perjury trial and subsequent judicial proceedings.
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court. Political in motivation, the charges against him were nonetheless
cast by successive attorneys general into legal form and pursued in the
face of clear judicial precedent. Bridges survived the "communist"
charges, but his ordeal left the Justice Department with an unhealed
wound.
It is ironic that the Smith Act, largely intended to force the deportation
of Harry Bridges, failed in its primary purpose but succeeded in establish-
ing, almost without debate, the first peacetime sedition law since 1798.107
It is equally ironic that the Justice Department, during the Roosevelt ad-
ministration, avoided prosecuting Communist Party leaders under the
provisions designed to punish advocates of revolutionary doctrine. The
congressional sponsors of these provisions had directly aimed them at the
"Bolshevik" allies of the Soviet Union. 108 The German invasion of Rus-
sia in June 1941, however, changed the erstwhile revolutionaries into ar-
dent patriots and immunized the party's leaders from prosecution until
Cold War politics gripped the Truman administration. 109
The final irony of the Smith Act is that its first victims were members
of the miniscule Socialist Workers Party (SWP), a Trotskyite group that
detested the Communist Party and its Stalinist policies. The SWP's vocal
opposition to Roosevelt's wartime alliance with Stalin made its leaders
obvious targets for federal surveillance. Domestic political factors, how-
ever, had a greater impact on the decision to bring Smith Act indictments
against SWP leaders. The party's bastion was in Minneapolis, among
members of the Teamsters Union. In June 1941, the SWP-led Teamsters
local withdrew from the American Federation of Labor and joined the
Congress of Industrial Organizations. This threat to his leadership
prompted Dan Tobin, the Teamsters president and a Roosevelt ally, to
appeal for federal action against the SWP apostates. Tobin's request
brought immediate action. On June 28, federal marshals raided the
SWP's Minneapolis office and twenty-nine party leaders were subse-
quently indicted for Smith Act violations. "10
Francis Biddle authorized the SWP prosecutions as acting attorney
general and publicly trumpeted the indictments as the opening shot in a
national drive against radicals and communists. " '1 Eighteen of the defen-
dants were convicted and sentenced to prison. Although the SWP leaders
107. Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798).
108. See, e.g., 86 CONG. REC. at app. 4085-88 (remarks of. Rep. Leland Ford).
109. The Supreme Court upheld the Smith Act convictions of eleven Communist Party leaders in
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). For an account of the Smith Act prosecutions, see M.
BELKNAP, COLD WAR POLITICAL JUSTICE (1977).
110. See R. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 28, at 252-53; Pahl, G-String Conspiracy, Political Reprisal
or Armed Revolt? The Minnesota Trotskyite Trial, 8 LABOR HISTORY 30 (1967).
111. Pahl, supra note 110, at44-45.
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refused to disavow the "revolutionary aims" of the party. none of the
documents submitted as evidence at the trial went beyond advocacy of
"mass action, propaganda and mass agitation" as complements of the
party's participation in trade union work and electoral campaigns. None-
theless, the federal appellate court that upheld the convictions professed
no doubt that "force was the ultimate means" intended in the party's
campaign against capitalism.' 12 Ruling in 1943, the Supreme Court re-
fused to review the convictions and the SWP leaders served their sen-
tences. 113
Much later, writing in his memoirs, Biddle confessed that "I have
since come to regret that I authorized the prosecution" of the vocal but
isolated Trotskyites. He admitted that "by no conceivable stretch of a
liberal imagination" had the defendants ever posed a "clear and present
danger" to the government they were charged with conspiring to over-
throw. 114 Wartime pressures also prompted another sedition prosecution
intended to balance the political scales. Responding to a flurry of notes
from Roosevelt that were attached to "scurrilous attacks on his leader-
ship" in the publications of American fascists, Biddle approved in June
1942 the indictment of twenty-six Nazi propagandists. The resulting trial,
which Biddle described as a "shockingly dreary and degrading experi-
ence," ended in a mistrial when the trial judge died. The indictments
were ultimately dismissed, and Biddle admitted his embarrassment but
not remorse at this second use of the Smith Act. 115
No single episode more dishonored the civil rights and liberties record
of the Roosevelt administration than the forced evacuation from the West
Coast of 110,000 Americans of Japanese ancestry.' '6 The travail of this
friendless and frightened minority began eleven weeks after the Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbor, when Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066 on
February 19, 1942.117 Predicated on the need to protect military installa-
112. Dunne v. United States. 138 F.2d 137 (8th Cir. 1943). cert. denied. 320 U.S. 790 (19431.
The court based its conclusion that "force was the ultimate means to be used by the Party in the
overthrow of the Government" on the finding that "'Defense Guards' made up of union members
were designed "to use force in protection of the unions. ld. at 149 (emphasis added).
113. Dunne v. United States. 320 U.S. 790 (1943) (writ of certiorai deniedl.
114. F. BIDEt,. supra note 74. at 152.
115. Id. at 235-43. Biddle admitted that pressure from Roosevelt had directly influenced his
decision to secure the sedition indictments. Id. at 238
116. The account below is based largely on P. IRONS, JUSTICt AT WxR ( 19831. This book. %lInch
discusses the evacuation decision and the political and bureaucratic forces that produced it. is primar-
ily concerned with the four test cases that reached the Supreme Court as challenges to vartous, ele-
ments of the internment program. These cases are discussed inft in text accompanying note%
129-43.
117. 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (1942). See also P. IRONS supra note 116. at 3-63 for discussmon of the
pressures that led to the evacuation decision and of the internal debate within the government that
preceded issuance of the executive order.
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tions from the threat of espionage and sabotage, this presidential edict
resulted in the internment of Japanese Americans in concentration
camps-euphemistically called "Relocation Centers'--scattered from
the California desert to the swamps of Arkansas. Before those camp resi-
dents certified as "loyal" by federal officials were released from confine-
ment, they spent an average of 900 days under armed guard, imprisoned
without charge or trial. 118
Historians and legal commentators have since condemned the evacua-
tion decision and internment program with virtual unanimity. 119 More
disturbing than these retrospective judgments is the fact that those who
framed the "military necessity" rationale for the incarceration of Japa-
nese Americans were conscious at the time of its falsity. Nonetheless,
over the ineffectual protests of two Justice Department lawyers, military
claims that Japanese-Americans had committed acts of espionage were
presented to the Supreme Court in the test cases that challenged the con-
stitutionality of the internment program. 120
Responsibility for the treatment of Japanese Americans rests with high-
ranking officials in each branch-executive, legislative, and judicial-of
the federal government. The evacuation decision, which resulted largely
from political pressure applied on the War Department by California offi-
cials and members of the West Coast congressional delegation,' 12 was
framed by a military officer who admitted that "no one has justified fully
the sheer military necessity for such action. ' 122 Secretary of War Henry
L. Stimson, who approved the executive order sent to the White House
for Roosevelt's signature, privately confessed his conviction that "it will
make a tremendous hole in our constitutional system." 123 Attorney Gen-
eral Francis Biddle also swallowed his doubts about the necessity for the
118. P. IRONS. supra note 116, at 64-74.
119. See, e.g., R. DANIELS. CONCENTRATION CAMPS USA: JAPANESE AMERICANS AND WORLD
WAR 11 (1972); M. GRODZINS, AMERICANS BETRAYED (1949); J. TEN BROEK. E. BARNHART & F. MAT-
SON, PREJUDICE, WAR. AND THE CONSTITUTION (1954); Dembitz, Racial Discrimination and the Mili-
tary Judgment, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 175 (1945); Rostow, The Japanese American Cases-A Disaster,
54 YALE L. J. 489 (1945); see also COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF CIVIL-
IANS. PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED (1983). This report of a congressional commission established in
1980, based on the testimony of some 750 witnesses and review of thousands of goverment docu-
ments, concluded that the internment was not justified by "military necessity" but resulted from a
combination of "race prejudice, war hysteria, and a failure of political leadership." Id. at 18.
120. See P. IRONS. supra note 116, at 278-92. The espionage claims were made in U.S. DEPART-
MENT OF WAR. FINAL REPORT: JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST. 1942, at 8 (1943).
121. SeeP. IRONS. supranote 116, at38-44,50-53.
122. Id. at 50. This officer, Colonel Karl R. Bendetsen, was on the staff of the judge advocate
general and worked closely with, and under the direction of, Assistant Secretary of War John J.
McCloy. Bendetsen was later appointed to direct the evacuation and internment program under Gen-
eral John L. Dewitt, commander of the Western Defense Command.
123. Id. at55.
Washington Law Review
executive order. Justice Department lawyers had strenuously argued to
Biddle that evacuation of a single racial group would be unconstitu-
tional. 124 Biddle later explained his capitulation to Stimson on the
grounds that "I was new to the Cabinet, and disinclined to insist on my
view to an elder statesman whose wisdom and integrity I greatly re-
spected." 125
More than any other government official, Assistant Secretary of War
John J. McCloy assumed the responsibility for guiding the executive or-
der to Roosevelt's desk. Determined to overcome Stimson's constitu-
tional qualms and Biddle's objections to evacuation, McCloy prevailed in
a dramatic show-down with the objecting Justice Department lawyers,
who were distressed to learn that the attorney general had bowed to Roo-
sevelt's entreaties and McCloy's insistence. 126 McCloy wasted no time in
directing the West Coast military commander, General John L. DeWitt,
to begin the evacuation of Japanese Americans from their West Coast
homes. 127 McCloy also took the initiative in pushing through Congress
the legislation that placed criminal penalties behind Dewitt's curfew and
exclusion orders, the initial steps in the internment program. 128
Given the unenviable choice between barbed-wire compounds and pri-
son bars, it is hardly surprising that only a handful of Japanese Americans
challenged DeWitt's orders in the courts. Three young men appealed their
criminal convictions to the Supreme Court. Minoru Yasui, a lawyer and
reserve Army officer who had been turned down for active service,
brought a test case against the curfew in Portland, Oregon. Gordon Hira-
bayashi, a college senior and Quaker pacifist, deliberately violated the
curfew and exclusion orders in Seattle. Fred Korematsu, a shipyard
welder, had been arrested for violating an exclusion order in San Lean-
dro, California. The final case to reach the Supreme Court involved a
young woman, Mitsuye Endo, who filed a habeas corpus petition after
reporting for internment in California. 129
124. Id. at 44-45, 52-56, 61-63.
125. F. BIDDLE. supra note 74. at 226. Biddle also noted that Roosevelt was not troubled that
evacuation of Japanese Americans would constitute a basic violation of civil rights and liberties. '.If
anything, he thought that rights should yield to the necessities of war. " Id.
126. P. IRONS. supra note 116. at 61-63. When Biddle announced his agreement with the War
Department, his two assistants at the meeting, Edward J. Ennis and James H. Rowe. Jr.. were devas-
tated. "'Ennis almost wept," Rowe later said. " I was so mad that I could not speak at all myself...
Id. at 62.
127. Id. at 64.
128. Id. at 64-68. The statute passed by Congress to enforce Roosevelt's executive order. Pub.
L. No. 77-503, provided a maximum one-year sentence for violation of any military orders issued
under authority of Executive Order 9066. Ch. 191, 56 Stat. 173 (1942).
129. P. IRoNs. supra note 116, 75-103.
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Confining its initial rulings to the curfew issue, the Supreme Court
unanimously affirmed in June 1943 the convictions of Yasui and Hirabay-
ashi. 130 Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone, in the Hirabayashi opinion,
cited the Army's claim that the "racial attachments" to their ancestral
homeland made reasonable the suspicion that Japanese Americans posed
a danger of espionage and sabotage. Refusing to question the judgment of
military officials, Stone wrote that "it is not for any court to sit in review
of the wisdom of their action or substitute its judgment for theirs." 131 At
the time, Justice Department lawyers were aware that military intelli-
gence reports contradicted the Army's "disloyalty" claim. The Court,
however, was not aware of this when it decided these first cases, because
Solicitor General Charles Fahy rebuffed Justice Department lawyers' ef-
forts to bring these reports to the Court's attention, despite objections that
failure to do so "might approximate the suppression of evidence." 132
Eighteen months passed before the Supreme Court ruled on the two
remaining internment cases. During this time President Roosevelt paid
more attention to partisan factors than to the plight of Japanese Ameri-
cans. Secretary of War Stimson informed Roosevelt in May 1944 of the
Army's opinion that the internment program could be safely ended. Con-
cerned about the potential electoral consequences of such a move, the
President brushed aside this request. 133 Despite the urgings of military
leaders and Cabinet members, Roosevelt held the Japanese Americans
hostage to political concerns until the Supreme Court forced his hand in
the Endo case. Decided in December 1944, this decision finally opened
the gates of the internment camps. 134
Though the Court held unanimously in Endo that Congress had not au-
thorized an indefinite internment program, the Justices split over the con-
stitutionality of the military orders that preceded and led to internment.
The Supreme Court's bitter division in the Koremnatsu case reflected two
factors: the shifting tides of war toward the United States and its allies;
and recognition that racism had motivated the internment. With ultimate
wartime victory in sight, the Court's unanimity in Hirabayashi and Yasui
eroded. The Korematsu opinion, written by Justice Hugo Black for a six-
member majority, was defensive in tone and narrowly circumscribed in
130. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115
(1943).
131. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 93, 96-98.
132. P. IRoNS. supra note 116, at 202-06.
133. Id.at268-77.
134. ExParte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944). Justice William O. Douglas, who wrote for a unani-
mous Court, confined his opinion to the narrow question of whether Congress had expressly author-
ized the internment camps, finding it had not. Douglas did. however, hold that "initial detention in
Relocation Centers" was lawful. Id. at 301.
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upholding the exclusion orders. 135 General DeWitt's public comment that
"a Jap's a Jap," 136 and the claim in his official report on the internment
program that Japanese Americans belonged to "an enemy race,"' 37
clearly embarrassed Black.138 Asserting that Korematsu had not been or-
dered to leave his home town "because of hostility to him or his race,"
Black rested his opinion on unspecified "evidence of disloyalty" among
the Japanese Americans.139 Justice Frank Murphy, the most outraged of
the three dissenters, found no such evidence in the record and retorted
that internment represented nothing more than the "legalization of ra-
cism. ''140
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the Korematsu case was the high-
level decision to prevent the Supreme Court from learning of the exis-
tence of official reports that refuted the "military necessity" rationale for
internment. In his Final Report to the War Department on the program,
General DeWitt had charged Japanese Americans with the commission of
acts of espionage, including the transmission of visual and radio signals
to Japanese submarines off the West Coast. 141 Two Justice Department
lawyers, suspicious of DeWitt's claims, persuaded Attorney General Bid-
dle to order investigations by the FBI and the Federal Communications
Commission. The reports of these agencies to Biddle conclusively refuted
DeWitt's unsupported allegations. 42
Convinced that the "lies" and "intentional falsehoods" in the DeWitt
report should be brought to the attention of the Supreme Court, the two
lawyers added a footnote to the government's Korernatsu brief that al-
luded to the countering reports and disavowed any reliance on the espion-
age claims. But after the last-minute intervention of Assistant Secretary
of War John McCloy, Solicitor General Charles Fahy pulled the brief
from the printing press and excised the confessional footnote from it. 143
Bureaucratic politics thus prevailed over professional ethics and the integ-
rity of the judicial system.
135. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
136. P. IRONS. supra note 116. at 193.
137. Id. at 58.336.
138. Id. at 336-37.
139. Koremnatsu. 323 U.S. at 223.
140. Id. at 242 (Murphy, J., dissenting). The other dissenters were Justices Owen Roberts and
Robert Jackson.
141. U.S. DEPARTMENTOF WAR. supra note 120. at 4, 8.
142. P. IRONS, supra note 116, at 278-84.
143. Id. at 284-92. McCloy, in his 1981 testimony before the Commission on Wartime Reloca-
tion and Internment of Civilians, doggedly defended the internment program. characterizing it as
"retribution" for the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Id. at 351-54.
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POLITICS AND PRINCIPLES-THE ROOSEVELT RECORD IN
RETROSPECT
Any fair assessment of the Roosevelt record on civil rights and liberties
must balance accomplishments with failures. More importantly, such an
assessment must judge Roosevelt's record against those of the presidents
who preceded and followed him, in particular those who share the "pro-
gressive" mantle that historians have draped over his shoulders. Wood-
row Wilson, another wartime president, permitted his attorney general to
unleash a "Red Scare" that led to the imprisonment or deportation of
hundreds of political dissidents. Harry Truman, who displayed a genuine
commitment to the civil rights of black Americans, approved an "em-
ployee loyalty" program that paved the way for the excesses of McCar-
thyism. 144 More conservative presidents have devised "enemies lists"
and have pressured the Justice Department to support tax credits for ra-
cially segregated private schools. 145 In truth, no twentieth-century presi-
dent has displayed a consistent and unbending commitment to principles
of civil rights and liberties. Political factors, often affected by foreign
policy crises, have diminished the support given by even the most pro-
gressive presidents to constitutional principles.
Franklin D. Roosevelt was no exception to this pattern, although the
balance sheet of his administration includes some positive accomplish-
ments. After six years of neglect under the direction of Homer Cum-
mings, the Justice Department turned its attention to such problems as
police brutality against blacks and the repression of religious sects. Those
who succeeded Cummings as attorney general during the Roosevelt ad-
ministration brought a number of significant prosecutions under the civil
rights statutes, which had gathered dust since their passage after the Civil
War. However constrained by inadequate funding and the lack of judicial
precedent to back up effective enforcement, the efforts of the CRS cannot
be dismissed.
In the final analysis, however, the debits on this ledger outweigh the
credits. The persecution of Harry Bridges and the Smith Act prosecutions
evidenced both a capitulation to political pressures and a disregard for the
dictates of due process. Politics and prejudice combined to bring about
144. See R. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 28, at 298-305.
145. The crimes of the Nixon administration and its assaults on civil liberties have been exhaus-
tively documented. See, e.g., R. BEN-VENISTE & G. FRAMPTON. JR.. STONEWALL (1977); L. FRIED-
MAN. UNITED STATES V. NIXON (1974); U.S. GOVERNMENT. WATERGATE SPECIAL PROSECUrION
FORCE. FINAL REPORT (1975). For the adverse decision by the Supreme Court on the tax credit policy
of the Reagan administration, see Bob Jones University v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983)
(nonprofit private schools that employ racially discriminatory admission standards on the basis of
religious doctrine do not qualify as tax-exempt organizations under the Internal Revenue Code, nor
are contributions to such schools deductible as charitable contributions).
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the wartime internment of Japanese Americans, the ugliest blot on the
Roosevelt record. In addition, later administrations based assaults on civil
liberties on programs initiated by Roosevelt; he authorized the Justice De-
partment to engage in the warrantless wiretapping of suspected "subver-
sives," and permitted the FBI to compile a "Security Index" of persons
targeted for summary arrest and imprisonment during times of "national
emergency." 146 The "Huston Plan" of the Nixon administration, which
proposed "surreptitious entries" and other illegal practices as part of a
domestic intelligence program, 147 had its origins in FBI activities that
Roosevelt had approved.
This article has placed great emphasis on the role of the men who
served under Roosevelt as attorney general in setting the "moral tone"
for the Justice Department in its task of enforcing the laws intended to
protect civil rights and liberties. The contrast between Homer Cummings
and Frank Murphy, in particular, illustrates the importance of this funda-
mentally personal factor. But the men who direct the Justice Department
are chosen by the President and serve at his pleasure. When politics and
principles clash in significant cases, the resulting conflicts are most often
resolved in the Oval Office of the White House. The "moral tone" set by
Franklin D. Roosevelt in the crucial area of civil rights and liberties was,
regrettably, one more of disdain than determination.
146. See R. GOLDSTEIN. supra note 28, at 298-306.
147. Id. at 485-86.
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